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ing is asking for an arbitrated or adjudicated settlement. So there is actually no lack
of claims with respect to the U.S.-Canada acid rain issue.
The Chernobyl situation is indeed perplexing. I think some of the responses of the
states can be explained in terms of politics; the Eastern European countries, for exam-
ple. And Dr. Giindling's statement regarding precedent reminds me of a statement by
Ian Browlie. He said, and my own inquiries have supported this, that many European
countries were afraid of what he calls a "normative boomerang"-that is that they
would make this argument vis-i-vis the Soviet Union, and other European countries,
for example Finland with respect to Sweden, would turn the argument around and use
it back against the initial author of the statement.
ALICE M. NOBLE-ALLGIRE*
INTERNATIONAL DEBT: How CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
REGAIN CREDITWORTHINESS?
The panel was convened by its Chair, Cynthia C. Lichtenstein,** at 4:00 p.m., April
5, 1989.
REMARKS BY CYNTHIA LIcHTENsTrEm
Let me say that this discussion is extraordinarily timely, since the U.S. Department
of the Treasury announced on March 10 a shift in the U.S. policy approach to the debt
crisis. This shift was expressed in a speech by Secretary Brady at a meeting before the
Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee Conference on Third World
Debt. The speech was issued as a press release and has been very much written about
in the press.
In the absence of a representative on the panel from the government to speak for the
Treasury Department, I shall have the temerity to try to tell you, by what I have
gathered from the text of Secretary Brady's talk, what the "Brady Plan" is, and then
our panelists will comment further and relate their prepared talks to the new
initiative.
The debt crisis became public in 1982 with the admission by Mexico that it would
be unable to meet, on a current basis, its external debt denominated in external curren-
cies, and rescue was arranged. It was at that moment that the true situation, both of
the developing country debtors and their private bank creditors, became public. Since
1982, there has been what has been referred to as "ad hoc management" of the debt
crisis. The reason there has not been any overall solution to the debt crisis is that if
the major banks, and particularly the U.S. banks, that had lent to the Latin debtors
had attempted in 1982 to write down or to forgive the debt, or to admit that the debt
was, in effect, in default, they would have become publicly insolvent. This was not a
possibility, because if the major U.S. money center banks, which also participate in the
international payments system and run the global dollar payments system for the
world, were to become insolvent, there suddenly would be no international payments
system and no international trade. Everyone, as a result, shouted "Of course the Em-
peror has clothes! Of course these debts will be paid, somehow, someway, and there-
fore we do not have to recognize that these banks are technically insolvent." In the
*J.D. candidate, Southern Illinois University.
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meantime, of course, very quietly, the central banks of the countries of the creditor
banks had gotten together and were beginning to insist on improvement of the capital
positions of the creditor banks. These improvements have reached the extent that it is
possible today for the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Mr.
Seidman, to say that if in fact the banks today have to write off the debt in toto, they
could afford to do so. They would not like to do so, but they can afford to do so
without becoming insolvent.
This new capacity for debt reduction by the private creditor banks has provided,
institutionally and systemically, a real opportunity. Those of you who have followed
this area know that in the World Bank/Fund meetings in Seoul, South Korea, in 1985,
then Treasury Secretary Baker had produced a plan for dealing with the debt crisis
that was based on the notion of growth, that is, each of the middle-income indebted
countries should adopt appropriate policies that would permit their economies to
grow out of the debt difficulties utilizing additional funding from the multilateral in-
ternational institutions and much new money from the creditor banks. There has
been a problem with the scheme; the creditor banks, to say nothing of the multina-
tional institutions, had difficulty explaining to their stockholders why they should vol-
untarily lend more money to debtors who probably could not pay, and why funds so
lent should be used to pay themselves interest that the debtors owed. So in fact, the
Baker Plan went no place.
Indeed, as our economist Mr. Williamson will detail, with the increase in interest
rates that we have seen in the last six months, and most of the private bank lending on
a floating rate basis, the situation has deteriorated extraordinarily. In fact, at this
point the Latin countries are paying out more in interest than they are taking in in
terms of external currencies. Therefore, Secretary Brady's announcement, while it
purports to be an extension of the Baker Plan, is in fact a great change. What the
Brady Plan says is that it is absolutely necessary, in order to enable these nations to
return to creditworthiness, that they reduce the total amount of debt and debt service.
New lending, while it may be necessary temporarily, only adds to the total amount of
debt service. We must therefore find a way to help these countries to reduce the total
amount of debt. However, the reduction in debt is to be voluntary, that is to say,
Secretary Brady is not suggesting that the governments require the private banks to
write down their debt, nor is he suggesting that the governments should rewrite the
debt contracts for the banks. Instead, Mr. Brady suggests that multinational lending
institutions could provide the kind of instruments that banks (or at least some of
them) would be willing to exchange for the debt and hold in their portfolios. These
instruments--bonds-would be issued in effect at a discount. The details of calculat-
ing this discount will be discussed by Mr. Williamson. There is a second device for
reducing debt, something called "buy-back," a concept that also will be explained by
Mr. Williamson.
We should recognize that the Brady Plan does in effect shift the responsibility for
paying off private debt to public funding, in the sense that it is tax monies that ulti-
mately go to fund the International Monetary Fund. Some of the industrialized coun-
tries are concerned about this aspect. Otherwise there has been great general support
for the Brady Plan.
How much in fact this new approach will help, and whether or not the Brady Plan
will be sufficient to make a dent in the debt situation, which is absolutely desperate for
the Latin nations, we shall not know for some time. Mr. Williamson will also describe
to you other approaches that might be used in meeting these issues. That is the back-
ground of our topic.
Before turning to our panelists, I did want to mention one thing upon which I have
not seen comment in all the press coverage concerning the Brady Plan. There has
been a concerted attempt to increase the capital of the multinational banks. The inter-
esting point about the Brady Plan is the call for guarantees, or collateralization of
bonds that might be issued by the debtor nations in exchange for the debt, to be given
by the multinational financial institutions. Under the Basel agreed-upon capital stan-
dards, as implemented for instance by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, U.S.
national banks will be required to hold far less capital against an obligation that has
been guaranteed or collateralized by a multinational institution than they would
against an obligation by one of the debtor nations that is not so collateralized. Thus,
in fact the new capital rules are providing a very serious incentive to the banks to
exchange.
REMARK BY TOBIAS M. C. ASSER*
The issue before us is a complex one. The amounts of international commercial
debt outstanding are staggering. The amounts of debt relief that are being suggested
are much larger than was proposed some years ago under the so-called Baker Plan.
Hundreds of commercial banks from many jurisdictions are involved in debt reduc-
tion operations. There are significant differences in the laws that apply to the various
loan contracts. Loan covenants covering the same substance show remarkable textual
variety, following differences in applicable law as well as the predilections of their
drafters. Finally, there are important differences between the various borrowers. It is
against this complex background that the recent proposals of Treasury Secretary
Brady must be evaluated.
As part of his remarks to the Brookings Institution and The Bretton Woods Com-
mittee Conference on Third World Debt on March 10, 1989, Secretary Brady pro-
posed several steps to revitalize the current strategy for dealing with the international
debt crisis, as follows. First and foremost, debtor nations should focus particular at-
tention on the adoption of policies that can better encourage new investment flows,
strengthen domestic savings, and promote the return of flight capital. Second, the
creditor community should provide more effective and timely financial support, in-
cluding debt service reduction.
Starting from the premise that sharing and negative pledge clauses in existing loan
agreements are a substantial barrier to debt reduction, Mr. Brady specifically pro-
posed as a key element of his approach "the negotiation of a general waiver of the
sharing and negative pledge clauses for each performing debtor, to permit an orderly
process whereby banks which wish to do so, negotiate debt or debt service reduction
transactions."
Secretary Brady suggested that such waivers might have a three-year life, to stimu-
late activity within a short but measurable timeframe. He expected the waivers to
accelerate sharply the pace of debt reduction and pass the benefits directly to the
debtor nations. Several days later, Assistant Treasury Secretary David Mulford made
similar statements to the U.S. Senate and House Banking Committees and to the An-
nual Meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank in Amsterdam. Secretary
Brady repeated and expanded on his proposals in his remarks on the international
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